reallocation process, and as the Dust Bowl indicates, the environmental consequences can be very significant. Many environmental issues examined by economists and political scientists, such as common-pool problems, result from the absence of well-defined property rights. The issue examined in this paper, is a different, although related one. Here we address the environmental costs of an inappropriate allocation of property rights, where the rights distribution does not rapidly adjust to a more efficient arrangement.
II. The Assignment and Reallocation of Property Rights.
One of the most important lessons of Coase's 1960 article, "The Problem of Social Cost," was that the initial assignment of property rights did not matter for efficiency so long as the transactions costs of reallocation were zero. Various examples, such as the problem of damages inflicted by a cattle-raiser on a farmer's fields, were used to make the point that if property rights could be costlessly traded, then assignment of liability would have no long-run effect on the allocation and use of resources. Coase recognized, however, that if transactions costs were high, then the liability rule or property rights assignment did matter for the overall value of production: "In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates. One arrangement of property rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other." 2 Coase emphasized the transactions costs associated with searching and negotiating exchanges of rights. He did not stress the effects of political intervention that could impede transfers.
Recognizing that transactions costs generally are positive, three issues arise in the assignment of property rights and the internalization of externalities: What process determines the initial rights allocation; what are the social costs associated with the observed assignment;
and what transactions costs might limit reallocation toward a more efficient arrangement?
In this paper, we address all three issues by examining American land policy in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries as it applied to the Great Plains. We argue that there were powerful political pressures for piecemeal division to meet broad demand for land. Small homesteads of 160 acres were efficiently sized for farming in the central and eastern parts of North America where rainfall was abundant. But they were not viable for more arid regions. Until the 1920s, however, there was little knowledge of the climate of the Great Plains or of appropriate farm sizes and farming practices for such a region. We examine the political economy of federal land policy to determine why it was not significantly adapted for the more arid conditions.
Second, we examine the social costs of the assignment of property rights to small farmers. By the 1920s, officials of the Agricultural Experiment Stations and Department of Agriculture recognized that small farms were more likely to fail during the droughts that periodically swept the region. We analyze the characteristics of farms that survived the severe 1917-21 drought in the northern Great Plains, using manuscript census data and county directories. Controlling for other factors, small farms were less apt to endure drought. Further, we argue that their cultivation practices during drought contributed to severe wind erosion.
Because they were constrained by size, small farmers intensively cultivated their land, did not place portions in fallow, and did not diversify into pasture. Such cultivation made the soil more vulnerable to wind erosion, culminating in the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. The Dust Bowl was one of the most serious environmental events of the 20 th century, and we assert that the property rights assignment contributed directly to its severity. If verified, this is a point not made previously in the literature.
The third issue addressed in the paper is the nature of the transactions costs involved in consolidating farms, adjusting the original allocation of property rights toward farm sizes that better reflected the requirements of the region. Although small farms were more likely to fail during any particular drought, the process of consolidation took a long time. To demonstrate the process of property rights adjustment we compare changes in farm size between 1920 and 1987 in the Great Plains region and in the Midwest where small farms were viable. We also include data for a major wheat-growing region of Australia, New South Wales, where the climate was similar to that in the Great Plains. Changes in the relative prices of labor and capital led to larger farms in all regions. We argue, however, that because farms in the Great Plains started off "too small," more drastic farm size changes were required than took place in the Midwest or in
Australia. Yet, local politicians and community leaders resisted the loss of rural population associated with farm consolidation and lobbied for subsidies to maintain the farm population.
Small family farmers were an important political constituency. 3 Beginning in the 1930s, the Federal Government provided substantial relief payments to small farms. Although these supplemented farm-based income, they prolonged the operation of inefficient, small farms and delayed the transition to larger units. Additionally, homesteaders were risk takers and they resisted selling their properties for consolidation.
II. U.S. Policy for the Assignment of Property Rights to Land.
From the beginning, U.S. land policy emphasized small-farm distribution. Thomas
Jefferson claimed that: "The small landholders are the most precious part of the state." 4 The
Homestead Acts were the most important policy vehicle. Under the 1862 law, any family head could claim between 40 and 160 acres, and upon 5-years continuous residence and improvement (cultivation), receive title. This allocation arrangement worked well in northern agriculture east of the 100 th meridian, where there were no important economies of scale and where there was sufficient rainfall (above 30 inches a year). As migrants moved across the frontier, they could transplant farming practices, crops, and farm sizes used to the east or in Europe. Under these circumstances, property rights were assigned quickly and agriculture developed rapidly, with livestock and grain production a major contributor to GNP. No important externalities were left uninternalized.
By 1880, however, the frontier reached the Great Plains (Figure 1) During major migration to the Great Plains between 1880 and 1920, there were no longterm weather records to document the limited and fluctuating precipitation of the region. Neither the agricultural experiment stations nor the USDA had experience with dry land farming to recommend appropriate agricultural techniques for semi-arid conditions. 8 During wet periods, the Great Plains were extremely productive with high crop yields, and small-farm, eastern agriculture could be quite successful. During drought, however, yields would collapse, and small farms would be at risk.
Absent much understanding of the weather, various doctrines were accepted as ameliorating the problem of potential aridity. One was "rain follows the plow," a notion that rainfall was endogenous with settlement, and through cultivation, precipitation would increase.
The other was dryfarming doctrine that asserted that through intensive cultivation of small farms sufficient moisture could be stored in the soil to counter any drought period. Severe droughts in the southern plains in 1893-94 tended to discredit the notion that rainfall was increasing, but dryfarming doctrine remained dominant until the early 1920s. The estimated equations are:
Yes/ Abstentions = b + a 1 population change + a 2 value of corn production + a 3 value of manufacturing + a 4 Republican.
16
The results are reported in There were numerous problems with small homesteads. One was that because of their limited size, it was impractical to diversify from wheat into livestock. Cattle were attractive because they could be raised even when wheat yields were low, and real wheat and cattle prices were not correlated (.09). Maintaining some livestock could be a means of smoothing incomes.
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Further, because of grass cover pastureland was much less vulnerable to wind erosion during drought. In contrast, because they were intensely cultivated, small farms increased the risk of wind erosion.
Under wet conditions and high wheat yields, a small enterprise could produce enough to sustain a family by placing the entire farm in crops. Returns were comparable to mean farm earnings elsewhere in the country. Continuous cropping, however, resulted in the land being plowed and cultivated throughout the year without the use of fallow. Fallow was a practice of idling half of a farm each year with protective mulch to collect moisture and nutrients. But only larger farms could afford to keep so much land out of production. Strip cropping (alternating bands of fallow and crop) and other practices designed to mitigate drought and protect soil against wind were not feasible. 21 As a result, drought was much more devastating to homesteads than to other farms. Loan foreclosures and farm abandonment were much higher for homesteads than for larger farms in the Great Plains. and 1921, and many farms failed. As shown in Table 3 , larger farms were more apt to survive.
In Fergus County 28 percent of the farms survived to 1922, and these farms were about 33 percent larger in 1916 than were those that failed. 23 Similarly in Cascade County, 33 percent of the farms survived to 1923, and they were about 22 percent larger than non-survivors. Farms that were larger in 1916 also were more likely to endure through the decade.
Additionally, one of the few surviving agricultural census manuscript records for 1920 The results of the probit analysis are shown in Mean farm size for the 61 surviving farms was 157 crop acres and 375 total acres, whereas for the 48 non-surviving farms, it was 129 crop acres and 331 total acres. Survivors then were about 18 percent larger in terms of crop acres and 12 percent larger for total acres than those farms that failed. Surviving farms were not only larger, but they were more diversified into livestock. The mean value of livestock for survivors was $1,906, more than double the mean of $817 for non-survivors. Wheat sales also were higher for survivors at $277 on average, compared to $189 for non-survivors.
A farm with the mean sample characteristics had a 61 percent chance of survival.
Increasing total crop acres by one standard deviation raises probability of survival to 72 percent, and if the value of wheat sales also is increased by one standard deviation, the probability of survival rises to 80 percent. These results underscore the general observation that larger farms were more likely to survive the drought.
The agricultural economics literature in the 1930s stressed size as the key factor in enduring drought. For example, Renne (1936b, 4) criticized the Homestead Acts for leading to the proliferation of small uneconomical holdings in the northern plains. In commenting on drought and farm failure on the Great Plains, Johnson (1937, 153, 162) cited the problem of homesteads. Starch (1939, 119) argued that farms had to be diversified into wheat and livestock to withstand dry periods, but noted that sufficient livestock were not possible on small units.
Clawson, Saunderson and Johnson (1940, 34) pointed to widespread loan foreclosures and the subsequent abandonment of small farms. Huffman and Paschal (1942, 17) claimed that even in 1942: "Many operators still are trying to farm land unsuited to cultivation. Their units are too small and they have little security against drought."
IV. Small Farms and the Dust Bowl.
The Dust Bowl was certainly one of the major environmental crises of the twentieth century in North America. 35 Intense wind erosion began in the northern plains in 1931 and moved to the south and lasted through 1940. 1938 was the peak year. The storms were huge, some 600 by 400 miles, lasting 10 hours or more. Marquette Michigan, and 10 tons across the continent in New Hampshire. 36 Johnson (1947, 194-5) Conservation Service estimated that 80 percent of the land in the southern plains had been subject to wind erosion, with 40 percent to a serious degree. 10,000,000 acres had lost the upper five inches of topsoil, and 13,500,000 acres had lost 2 1/2 inches, with an average loss of 480 tons of topsoil per acre. Dust smothered adjacent range and crop land.
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Because light, rich topsoil was most likely to be carried away, leaving sandy infertile soil behind, wind erosion depleted soil quality and productivity. Damaged areas required the addition of fertilizers and organic material to reconstruct soil productivity. Samples of soil carried 500 miles from Texas to Iowa had 10 times as much organic matter, 9 times as much nitrogen, 19 times as much phosphoric acid, and 45 percent more potash as compared to the soil that remained.
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The Great Plains is a transitional climatic region most often affected by drought and has the continent's strongest winds. Under normal conditions of ground cover, wind erosion is a normal geologic process, but with sufficient cover the soil historically has not been seriously affected.
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Following Gutmann and Cunfer (1999, 9-10) wind erosion occurs as strong winds blow across dry soil. Beyond a threshold speed that varies according to soil characteristics and moisture, soil particles begin to move. The amount of erosion from a field is a function of the textural class of the soil (sandy soils are most vulnerable), slope, wind velocity, soil moisture, vegetative cover, surface aggregates (clumpiness lowers surface wind velocity), and size of exposed terrain.
With homestead settlement of the Great Plains the conditions for increased wind erosion were established. The native grasses were plowed as the land was placed into crops, and intensive cultivation reduced the size of soil particles. The soil, especially in the southern plains, already was sandy, and the region was flat with little to obstruct wind. In the 1930s, severe drought and high temperatures also lowered soil moisture. The soil became dust and was picked up by the wind.
Drought in the 1930s was a triggering factor for the Dust Bowl, but it was not a sufficient condition. Figure 2 plots Homestead farms also were too small to adopt the conservation practices that were found to be important for controlling wind erosion. USDA and Soil Conservation Service officials in the 1930s and subsequent investigators repeatedly cited small farms on the Great Plains as a principle source of the region's problems. They lamented the failure to adopt Powell's recommended 2,560-acre plots. 42 For example, Bennett and Fowler (1936, 6-7) stated that federal homestead policy to keep land allotments small and to require that a portion be plowed "is now seen to have caused immeasurable harm." The Great Plains Committee (1936, 3, 75) , appointed by President Roosevelt to address poverty and environmental damage concluded that "although we now know that in most parts of the Great Plains a farm of this size
[homestead] is far too small to support a family. They were required to put this land under plow, regardless of whether or not it was suited to cultivation."
Small marginal homesteads had to be completely cultivated to earn sufficient income to support a family. They were continuously cropped and cultivated, raised few livestock and therefore had little pasture and the associated protective grass cover. With declining agricultural prices in 1933 and dry conditions, small farmers especially had to plant as much as possible on their plots to try to offset falling yields and returns. Cooper, et al, (1938, 146-8) claimed that farms "are so small that the establishment of a system of farming that will conserve soil and produce a desirable family income is practically impossible."
As the Dust Bowl continued through the 1930s, soil conservation recommendations included a variety of cultivation techniques-strip cropping, wide spacing of crops with double width rows and partial fallow, contour plowing, stubble mulching and specialized plowing that maintained stubble cover, and reduced tillage. All of these practices required leaving about half of a farm uncultivated each year and the use of specialized equipment (duck foot plows, bar blade and rod weeders, shearing blades, improved tractors and combines) as well as new drought-resistant grains. 43 With limited acreage and high fixed investments, small farms were less apt to use these techniques or have the appropriate equipment.
Diversification into livestock also was recommended because maintaining pasture retained grass cover, but given low grazing capacities livestock made sense only for large units (Starch, 1939, 119) . Similarly, Thornthwaite (1936, 242) concluded that the small size of many farms precluded cattle raising and forced the cultivation of land which should have remained in grass, "…. in addition, the type of tillage which, because of its low cost, gives the farmer his only advantage is the primary cause of wind erosion so destructive in nature that it eventually renders the land unfit for cultivation."
IV. Transactions Costs and the Effect of Government Subsidies to Small Farms in the Slow Transition to Larger Farms.
The assignment of property rights to homesteads in the Great Plains created a small-farm path dependency that was slow to be corrected. Figure 3 this growth to changes in the relative price of farm labor to machinery, which grew at almost the same rate. Further, they argued that technical improvements were similar across machine types.
The 160-acre limit of the Homestead Act was not a binding constraint in the Midwest.
As late as 1920, a 160-acre farm was close to optimal in the region. From that time forward, only relatively moderate farm-size adjustments took place in response to changes in the relative factor prices. The homestead limit was binding on the Great Plains. Because of the dryer climate and variable precipitation that led to fluctuating yields, farms needed to be larger than the 160 or 320 acres allowed under the land laws. Through gradual consolidation of units, farm size increased over time, with the adjustment process slowing after 1960. As indicated in Figure 3 , the change in farm size moderated after 1965, suggesting that by that time much of the "catchup" from small homesteads had taken place.
Assuming that the following arrangement for both regions: Following the drought of 1917-21, it became increasingly clear that homesteads were not viable farm units on the Great Plains, yet they persisted and were only gradually replaced by larger units, as reflected in Figure 3 . 45 There are a number of reasons for the slow reallocation of property rights. One is that there was no abrupt end to homestead farms through severe drought.
Precipitation varied by region and year, so that if homesteaders survived one drought, they stayed as conditions improved. 46 Farmers only had to cover the opportunity costs for variable inputs, labor and capital, and their human capital was linked to agriculture with few other options in the region other than migration. Hence, farmers were reluctant to sell, staying on their farms as long as possible. Further, during wet conditions, homesteads performed well relative to other farms. Rainfall was uncertain, and since homesteaders were risk takers, they discounted future dry years and often rejected offers to sell their land. Another important reason is that small farmers were subsidized to continue.
Although in the early 1930s the Federal Government attempted to encourage outmigration and the formation of larger farms on the Great Plains through the Resettlement Administration, it had limited success. 47 In most cases the government purchase and resettlement programs eventually were resisted. 48 Only 581,696 acres were purchased in the southern plains. 49 Opponents alleged that the government was purchasing farms during a period of distress and taking them out of production. Government lands were removed from the local tax base.
The real thrust of government policy through relief and Agricultural Adjustment Act payments was to sustain family farms. The Department of Agriculture did not want to see a dramatic loss of farmers in the region. In its 1938 Yearbook of Agriculture, "Soils and Men," the agency noted the debate over whether to move farmers out of farming or to subsidize them, and sided with the latter: "it is wise to keep a large rural population"(pages 3-4). The department did not want to see a loss of its constituency in the region. Clawson, Saunderson, and Johnson (1940, 42-8) claimed that eliminating farms of less than 300 acres in eastern Montana would reduce the number of farms by 76 percent. But they doubted that many would be willing to accept such drastic steps. They still called for the elimination of 50 percent of the farms in the region from 1928-35 levels, and predicted it would take 30 years to do so with considerable government assistance. Thornthwaite (1936, 243-5) suggested that the Great Plains could sustain only two-thirds of the 1930 population. 50 But politicians feared such a loss in farm population and the related deterioration in local economic activity and national political influence. The number of representatives in the House was at stake. They lobbied for subsidies to maintain small farms through the Farm Security Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, and the Federal Emergency Recovery Administration. For example, $525 million was authorized in June 1934 for the region as drought relief. 51 The major historian of the Dust Bowl, Donald Worster (1979, 131-5) estimated that 3 out 4 farmers in the region received federal aid. Johnson (1947,190) counties. 52 The subsidies, however, helped to sustain many otherwise non-viable small farms, delaying the adjustment toward larger farm sizes. 53 Wheat farms received approximately one third of their income from federal subsidies (Rucker and Alston, 1987) .
Small farmers became an important political constituency. Although, larger units gradually replaced homesteads, the "family-farm" lobby became increasingly effective in securing preferential government support. In the 1930s and later in the 1970s, the lobby was able to secure legislation in Great Plains states to prohibit large 'corporate' farms.
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VI. Conclusion..
The Homestead Acts resulted in the formation of farms that were inappropriately small for the semi-arid Great Plains. Cultivation practices on those farms had important environmental consequences during drought. Had there been more complete knowledge of the climate and agricultural techniques suitable for the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the land laws might have been more significantly broadened to allow for much larger property rights allocations. As it was, the area was settled densely with small, family farms along a midwestern model. The process of consolidation of 160 and 320-acre homesteads into more viable units took a very long time. In the mean time, homesteads were more vulnerable to failure during drought, and we argue they disproportionately contributed to the Dust bowl of the 1930s.
A lack of alternatives and government relief and agricultural subsidies beginning in the 1930s slowed the reallocation of property rights by providing income supplements to small farmers. Regional politicians sought to maintain family farms and to prevent a sharp decline in rural population. Gradually, larger farms replaced homesteads, but family farms remained a powerful political constituency.
This case illustrates the difficult environmental problems that can be raised by an inappropriate assignment of property rights. It cannot be assumed that a more efficient allocation of rights with fewer negative environmental effects will occur quickly. In this situation, government policies raised the transactions costs of the reallocation of property rights to more efficient units. A similar problem exists in water allocation in the western United States where transfers from agriculture and across regions are restricted. Yet, current water rights allocations lead to inefficient use and related environmental costs.
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Endnotes
1 We are analyzing the relationships between small farms and their cultivation practices and wind erosion. We also are examining the effects of federal government subsidies on the persistence of small farms on the Great Plains. We are collecting data and this draft represents our preliminary results and arguments. In the 1950s and 1970s there were dust storms in the Great Plains, but not of the magnitude of the 1930s.
2 Coase (1960, 16) . See also Demsetz (1967, 349) for elaboration.
3 Even though there are fewer small farms today and current farms are larger than in the past, they remain an important political constituency. See Knoeber (1997).
4 Quoted in Hibbard, (1924 Hibbard, ( , reissued 1965 ). An example of the congressional debate over the need to reserve federal land for small farmers ("free homes for homeless people") is in Congressional Globe, 37 Congress, 2 nd Session, Wednesday May 7, 1862 (page1915).
5 Later, USDA and Extension Service personnel concluded that the failure to adopt Powell's recommendation was a critical policy error. See for example, the Report of the Great Plains Committee (1936, 1, 3, 7, 40, 42) . Kimmel (1940, 266) among others stated that farm reorganization was necessary in order to put into place "agriculture that should have been established in the first place. Had Major Powell's recommendation become a part of the national land policy in the 1870's many of the problems that now exist never would have occurred."
6 For discussion of the reaction to Powell's report, see Stegner (1953, 219-42) . See Peffer (1951, 8-62, 135-68) regarding the political controversy over homestead farm size, the claims of ranchers, and efforts to adjust the federal land laws. 7 The only support came from representatives of eastern states. See Smith (1950 Smith ( , reissued 1970 .
8 Libecap and Hansen (2001) examine the weather information problem facing migrants to the Great Plains. Renne (1936a, 33) also describes the weather information problem confronting settlers. Thornthwaite (1936, 202-7) , discusses the early lack of information about the region's climate and type of farming that could adapt to it. See also, Kraenzel (1955, 12-23 Peffer (1951, 134-169) and Hibbard (1924, 386-410) . 13 Congressional Record, 60 th Congress, Second Session, 6098, House of Representatives. There were 387 voting, answering "present" or abstaining: 141 yeas, 74 nays, 160 abstentions, and 12 "present." We considered the 12 who answered "present" as abstaining, giving 172 abstentions. We dropped the 5 Oklahoma observations in the analysis because of a lack of data for the independent variables. We estimated the equations using both Probit and OLS, and report the Probit results. They are virtually the same.
14 Peffer (1951, 33-58) . 15 The South had historically opposed homesteading and the Republican party had historically favored it. 16 Correlation coefficients among some of the independent variables are . -.40 for corn state and population change and -.41 for value of manufacturing by state. 17 . Early establishments were ranches and often large. Most of the land was held without formal title. Homestead entry intruded on ranches. See Libecap (1981) . The data are from County Directories. County Directories were assembled and published privately by R.L. Polk and W.T.Ridgley and are available for many U.S. counties at the Library of Congress. They are not annuals and the data often vary. 21 See Carl F. Kraenzel, (1942, , "On the whole, farms are too small in the Great Plains region. This is the result of homesteading practices." He called for diversification. Stephens (1937, 751) , and Bennett and Fowler (1936, 4) .
22 Eckert and Maughan (1939, 23-4) , Kimmel (1940, 265-6) . See Alston (1983) for analysis of farm foreclosures during the interwar period. Great Plains states were particularly hard hit. 23 The survivors and non-survivors are identified by matching the full name of individuals in the directory, including the middle name or middle initial. For Fergus County, the following probit equation For Fergus, the results indicate that for 1,000-acre increase from the average farm size, the probability of survival increases by 0.12. This small increase in probability is likely to be due to the problem of not being able to control other factors, such as experience or land quality. The probability of survival at the mean farm size of 315.1 in 1916 acres is 0.28. The probability of survival at mean plus one standard deviation of farm size (i.e. 708 acres) is 0.33. For a farm of 1,000 acres, the probability of survival is estimated to be 0.37, and for 1,425 acre farm the probability of survival increases to 0.57. For Cascade, the results indicate that for 1,000-acre increase from the average farm size, the probability of survival from 1916 to 1923 increases by 0.02. Similarly, for 1,000 acre-increase from the mean, the probability of survival from 1916 to 1929 increases by 0.03. The probability of survival from 1916 to 1923 at the overall 1916 mean farm size of 328.3 acres is estimated to be 0.33. There is a 33% chance that a farm with average acreage would survive into 1923 from 1916, given the 1916 farm size. Survival probability rises to 0.37 at 750.1 acres (mean + one std. deviation). Survival probability to 1929 is much lower at the mean acreage of 328.3; the probability of survival into 1929 with mean acreage is 0.17, and with mean + one std. Deviation is only 0.2. The survival probability to 1929 rises to 0.22 when farm size is 1,000 acres.
Agricultural Census Manuscript for Carbon County, Montana, US National Archives. Prices received by farmers for wheat, oats and potatoes sold are compiled from the USDA. 25 We include farmers that were listed in 1922 but not in 1919 for some reason, but had to have been there in 1919.
26 A "non survivor" might have failed due to drought, might have sold the farm, or passed it along to heirs. We cannot distinguish among these options, but attempt to control for them in the statistical analysis. 27 The county directories include the farmer's name, acreage, assessed value, and post office location. Because some names are common ones, to distinguish farmers we relied on post office addresses.
28 Farmers older than 65 in 1919 might not have "survived" because of health or death, rather than due to the effects of drought. We also use dummy variables to control for fixed effects of location. Location is based on post office addresses given in the county directories. These included Red Lodge, Luther, Laurel, Boyd, Joliet, Edgar, Silisia, and Roberts. Because some communities had all non-survivors, they too were dropped from the analysis, affecting 14 farmers.
29 Age was consistently significant at 5 percent or better in various runs. Other experience variables considered were years as farm owner, years as farm operator, and whether the individual owned the farm (yes/no), but none performed as well. We also considered including sex, but almost all farmers were male.
30 This variable is pasture for livestock only, deleting pasture for crops as included in the census. The total crop acres variable already includes crop land. 31 We considered a variety of financial and capital variables constructed from the census and most did not perform well, possibly because they were either not complete or well defined 32 The value of livestock is for livestock that can be sold. We do not include horse value since horses were capital stock for these farms and used in plowing the cultivated acres. 33 We experimented with a variety of wheat and crop variables in levels and shares. The value of winter and spring wheat sales was by far the most powerful variable. 34 The descriptive statistics are: Worster (1979, 85) . In examining the causes of the Dust Bowl, Bennett, Kenney, and Chapline (1938, 68-76) criticized past homestead policies and pointed to "repeated attempts at too intensive use of the soil have resulted in serious problems of depletion, in destruction of physical resources…." Kimmel (1940, 264) linked the Dust Bowl to the dense settlement of the plains by homesteaders who put the land into cultivation, displacing grass land. Bennett and Fowler (1936, 4-10) emphasized the use of farming practices that were brought from the East, but inappropriate for a semi-arid region. They particularly pointed to excessive plowing. They also pointed to overgrazing as contributing to the removal of land cover. How important this was in a region dominantly in grain is unclear. Ranchers did have very uncertain property rights to range land because they could not obtain title to the land that they used under the land laws. For discussion of this issue, see Libecap (1981) . 43 1938 Yearbook of Agriculture, "Soils and Men," pages 686-688. Summer fallow was the greatest source of moisture conservation. Hewes (1979, 167) discusses the costs of summer fallow, but does not make specific reference to whether small farms used it or not. Kraenzel (1955, 311) also discusses the problems of small farmers with a maximum of 320 acres. He noted that summer fallow could not make progress until farms were large enough. See also, Clawson, Saunderson and Johnson (1940, 36-41) . Renne, (1936a, 33) argued that ranches in the Great Plains had to be 6 to 8,000 acres to sustain a minimum sized herd of 200 animals and a farm 800 acres to allow for a minimum of 400 acres in crop and 400 acres in fallow each year. 44 For the transitional states that were bisected by the 100 th meridian we used county data following the Great Plains division described in Hargreaves (1957) for Montana and the Dakotas and Fite (1966) for Kansas. We connected these divisions through Nebraska. We also used just the eastern, non-mountain counties of Colorado. 45 Through the 1920s and 30s, USDA and extension service officials were extremely critical of past land policy and the small homesteads it created. During the 1930s, there were repeated calls for Federal Government policies to promote farm consolidation and the resettlement of "stranded farm families For example, see Johnson (1937, 153) and Great Plains Committee (1936, 79) . 46 Great Plains Committee (1936, 1) argued that many of the region's problems were associated with past land laws that encouraged homestead settlement. The committee noted that even so, the farmers "were in no mood to abandon their land."
